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Abstract 
 
 
The social dimension of membership offers a strategic entry point for analyzing the 
development of citizenship in the European Union (EU). The first part of this contribution 
discusses the functions of social citizenship in this emerging supra-national and multi-level 
governance network. Second, the analysis deals with two prominent and stylized paradigms 
that have sought to make sense of the multi-level quality of social citizenship in the EU: 
residual, and post-national concepts of membership and citizenship in liberal democracies. 
Although each of these approaches captures selected elements of social citizenship, they 
are unable to deal in a satisfactory way with rights on duties on multiple governance levels. 
Therefore, the discussion moves to an alternative concept, namely nested citizenship. This 
means that regional, national and supra-national forms of citizenship function in 
complementary ways, while the associated norms, rules and instutions are under constant 
revision and further development. Third, the analysis shows that the concept of nested 
citizenship can help to overcome the fruitless dichotomy of Euro-optimism and Euro-
pessimism concerning social policy and social citizenship. Both ideal-tpyical positions 
extrapolate the conditions of the nation-state to the supra-national level. Instead, this 
discussion suggests to conceive of European social citizenship as a ‘projet’ (Sartre), evolving 
towards a common past, present and future understanding of democratic principles and 
substantial rights. 
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1. Introduction1
 
 
We need to conceptualize social citizenship in the European Union (EU). The concepts we 
used in the past are not adequate to capture the emerging and novel characteristics of 
citizenship in the EU. Social citizenship in the EU is multi-level. It is embedded in a supra-
national and federated governance network with a mix of intergovernmental and genuine 
European authorities. Individual rights are now guaranteed on several levels of authority – 
supra-state, state and even regional. The EU started with a mercantile form of membership – 
but since Maastricht there is a EU form of citizenship. All citizens of member states now are 
citizens of the European Union. For example, they have the right to move about and live in 
any member states, albeit subject to exceptions. EU citizens living outside their own country 
in one of the member states can vote and be elected in municipal elections in their country of 
residence and in elections to the European Parliament. We can already see in the very 
definition of EU citizenship its multiple level character: You need to be a citizen of a member 
state to qualify for EU citizenship. 
 
EU citizenship is also multi-dimensional: There are the various dimensions of citizenship – 
civil, political, social and cultural. On the EU level, the civil and partly the political elements 
are the most developed while the rest leads a shadow existence. First, social rights and 
citizenship are of particular importance because we can simultaneously look at how national 
welfare states and the EU have developed. Interestingly, the rapid expansion of European 
national welfare states in the post-World War Two era coincided with the evolution of the 
European Union from the 1950s to the 1970s. Second, social policy is one of the realms in 
European integration in which the nation-state is still supposed to reign relatively supreme, 
albeit with some restrictions for state sovereignty and state autonomy. Cultural citizenship, 
albeit not legally codified, also plays a role for social policy because welfare state policies 
have an ethical and a moral dimension. 
 
For these two reasons, the dimension social citizenship is a ‘strategic research site’ (Merton 
1987). Therefore, social citizenship offers a strategic entry for those who want know more 
about European citizenship in a more general way. In turn, the development of citizenship is 
what Karl Polanyi (1944) aptly called the ‘second movement of society’. The first movement 
has been marketization, the removal of barriers to the free mobility of goods, capital, persons 
and services. The second movement consists of policy and citizenship responses to border-
crossing movement of the factors of production and reproduction, in order to reconcile 
individual freedom with social protection. After all, who is to be included into citizenship, and 
the extent of rights and duties have been forever contested (Walzer 1989). This exposé 
contributes to this line of analysis by conceptualizing social citizenship in the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Lecture held at my Habilitationskolloquium on June 30, 1999. I would like to thank Jürgen Gerdes, 
Carsten G. Ullrich, Michael Zürn and the participants in the InIIS-Kolloquium in the Wintersemester 
1999/2000 for helpful suggestions and criticism.  
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2. The Dimensions of Social Citizenship 
 
 
According to the Aristotelian tradition citizenship constitutes an expression of full and formal 
membership of individuals in a state or state-like structure (Aristotle 1962). Citizenship forms a 
continuing series of transactions among citizens, governed by a state or a state-like governance 
structure. In the academic tradition of political science, citizenship connotes the 
institutionalization of reciprocal obligations of members in a political community against each 
other (cf. Hammar 1990: chapter 2). States or governance networks such as the EU hold ties 
and webs of solidarity and reciprocity in trust for citizens in the political community. Citizens can 
claim a set of mutually enforceable rights and duties. In short, citizenship is the public 
representation of these ties.  
 
Broadly, the discussion follows T.H. Marshall’s distinction between civil, political and social rights 
of citizenship – but without seeing social rights as the most fully developed aspect of citizenship. 
We nowadays have settled immigrant populations in advanced welfare states who have bundles 
of social rights approaching those of naturalized citzens (Faist 1995). Yet they do not hold 
political rights and are not full citizens of the respective nation-state. This latter case usually is a 
temporary phenomena until the descendants of these immigrants acquire full citizenship in all 
dimensions in the second or third generation – albeit the situation is constantly perpetuated by 
immigrant newcomers. In short, there are instances where it is not social rights crowning 
citizenship but political membership in the polity as the endpoint of citizenship. What is important 
here is that we conceive of social citizenship as one aspect of citizenship. But we do not need to 
assume that the bearers of social rights are necessarily also full citizens. 
 
No matter whether we look at the civil, political or social aspect of citizenship, we need to 
consider at least two connections (see Figure 1): on the horizontal line – access and belonging, 
on the vertical line – the constitutional or foundational and institutional realm. As to the horizontal 
line: There is a tight coupling of citizenship: the access to legally guaranteed status and 
rights necessarily implies membership in a culturally defined community, the nation: 
nationality, or another form of political community, in the case of the EU: supra-nationality. It 
is important to realize this coupling because much social policy analysis tends to focus on 
the ‘access’ aspect only and tends to forget or at least neglect the ‘belonging’ aspect. 
Especially for social citizenship, the ‘belonging’ dimension is absolutely crucial because 
redistributive social policies need a basis in a common solidarity.2
 
                                                          
2 Citizenship as a normative concept refers to various dimensions of full membership in a polity. It 
“attempts to encompass in one word a legal status, a state of mind, a civic obligation, an 
immigration benefit, an international legal marking, and a personal virtue.” (Cover 1983). For our 
purposes, the distinction between constitutional-legal and political-institutional aspects is 
highlighted. Another distinction also is crucial, the one between the public recognition of state-
citizen ties in rights and duties, on the one hand, and the responsibility citizens shoulder in 
assocations in civil society (Bürgergesellschaft), on the other hand; see Kymlicka's and Norman's 
(1994) categories of citizenship-as-rights and citizenship-as-activity. This duality concerns the 
division of labor between state and citizens as members of a political community. For an example 
using this distinction, see Faist (1999). 
 
   6 
Figure 1: Dimensions of Citizenship 
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Regarding the vertical line: Guaranteed rights and duties on the constitutional realm need the 
implementation of policies within institutions. And within nationality or supra-nationality there 
is either a sort of privilege for certain ethnic characteristics of majority groups, or – in a 
multicultural political community – recognition of diverse cultural backgrounds. 
 
In order to explore notions of social citizenship in the EU we need to take a close look at the 
functions of social citizenship: First, there is a provision aspect: Social citizenship provides a 
context for the possession of social rights to a substantial package of key goods –  for 
example, education and social services. Second, there is a security aspect: It helps people to 
cope with employment and life-course risks and provide security, enable them to live a 
meaningful life according to the cultural standards of their respective social and political 
spaces. Third, there is an enabling aspect: many contemporary political theorists claim that 
the concept of social rights can help assure individuals of both a basic standard of living and 
an effective capacity to participate in politics. The ugly yet appropriate German term for this 
function is a Teutonic nominal composita, Staatsbürgerqualifikationspolitik (Preuß 1990; it 
would roughly translate into ‘citizen-enabling-policy’). And, fourth, there is the important 
legitimation aspect: Social citizenship enhances political stability and legitimacy by trust of 
people in the effective administration of social security by the rulers. Social policy historically 
has been not only an object of class struggle but an ‘instrument of statecraft’ (Flora 1986), a 
valuable source of mass legitimacy for politicians. The welfare state “...has been an 
administrative and political innovation of the first order, comparable in significance to the 
introduction of representative democracy ...” (de Swaan 1988: 149). And, we may add, the 
legitimation aspect of social rights and policies become even stronger in contemporary 
societies in which perceptions of cultural homogeneity are challenged by multicultural 
diversity and external effects such as Europeanization (cf. Habermas 1999). 
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This analysis deals with three models of citizenship (see Figure 2). The first perspective has 
the nation-state as its focus. The discussion also argues against an extreme version of the 
notion that social citizenship in the EU is of so little importance for nation-state citizenship to 
be negligible, namely residual citizenship. In other words, we question the proposition that 
the so-called ‘social dimension’ of the EU has born only minimalist results; ensconced by a 
lot of cheap talk. The second perspective sees the driving force of citizenship not at the 
nation-state but at the international and supra-national level: The advocates of post-national 
citizenship claim that a very significant amount of social rights, especially of settled non-
citizens but also citizens, are determined by international institutions such as the UN or 
supra-national institutions such as the EU. 
 
 
Figure 2: Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU 
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The position taken here is the third perspective, in the middle of residual citizenship on the 
one hand, and post-national citizenship, on the other hand. The proposition is that the real 
importance of European social citizenship lies in the fact that supra-state and state 
citizenship complement each other. Therefore, European social citizenship should be 
conceptualized as a form of nested citizenship.3
 
In order to arrive at this conclusion, the first part of the discussion describes the EU as a 
multi-level governance network in social policy-making. In the second step we discuss the 
question: What notion of social citizenship best describes the multi-level reality of social 
citizenship in the EU? The answer rejects exaggerated notions of  citizenship that focus 
mainly on the national welfare state – the residual notion of social citizenship – and also a 
citizenship concept that is transnationally oriented – post-national citizenship. They are not 
so much empirically wrong but misleading as research perspectives. They do not offer an 
appropriate conceptual tool kit to questions of membership in dynamic and multi-level 
governance networks. The third part then details the concept of nested membership as 
against the ideas of Euro-sceptics and Euro-optimists. 
                                                          
3 This definition builds upon Tsebelis’ (1995) definition and conceptualization of ‘nested games’, a 
contribution to social scientific game theory. 
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3. EU Social Policy and Rights in a Multilevel Governance System 
 
 
European policy-making and politics proceed in a substantial multi-level governance system 
(Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998; cf. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996). The EU clearly goes 
beyond a low-profile international regime, as an intergovernmental perspective would have it; 
although it has not developed into a coherent supranational institution, as the early 
functionalists envisaged (Haas 1958). Without taking a strong stand in these debates, it is 
fair to say that the European Union can be seen as a form of highly routinized and multiple 
governance structure. The EU is a supranational and federated governance network with 
mixed intergovernmental and common authorities. The interesting fact about the EU is that 
there are two sorts of ‘citizens’ – so to speak: nation-states and individual citizens of nation-
states. 
 
Moreover, within this multi-level governance system, the ‘rules of the game’ are constantly 
being developed and redefined. Social policy and accompanying rights have developed 
rapidly between the EU Charter of Social Rights in 1989 and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1997 which subjected more issue areas to qualified majority voting. This means that the 
institutional design of relations between nation-state and its citizens and supranational & 
federated governance network and their members is in considerable flux. This means that we 
currently observe a very dynamic citizenship system in its initial period of development in 
which citizenship rights and above all benefits decline for some categories of citizens while 
they increase for others. 
 
Social policy and rights-making is occuring on multiple levels in regard to areas in which 
interest groups such as the social partners are involved. Policy-making which involves social 
partners such as employer associations and labor unions has traditionally been a preserve of 
national-level bargaining. New trends of supra-national social partnership are especially 
visible in some policy areas in which explicit EU social policy competence has developed. 
We find that supranational actors such as the EU Commission – who has the right to propose 
legislation – encourages the building of rather comprehensive policy networks of state and 
non-governmental actors. These policy communities then discuss proposals in areas for 
which the EU has explicit policy competence. For example, prominent actors in such 
communities have been the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the Union of 
Industrial Corporations in Europe (UNICE). These collective actors on the EU-level are 
composed of representatives from nation-state trade union federations (Falkner 1998). 
 
Not surprisingly, there are now policy ‘ratchets’ in some issue areas, prohibiting member 
states from cutting back their existing regimes: Examples include the European Works 
Council Directive of 1994, Atypical Work (health and safety) Directive of 1991, Maternity 
Directive of 1992, Parental Leave Directive in 1996, Atypical Work Directive (working 
conditions and distortion of competition) in 1997. Interestingly, the latter two directives are 
the first in which the social partners will be explicitly involved; perhaps a sign of evolving 
‘polity communities’ (Falkner 1998: 114-45). Moreover, the Single European Act also 
included a new Article 118B stating that the Commission shall endeavor to develop the 
dialogue between management and labor at European level which could, if the two sides 
consider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement (Ross 1997: 591). 
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The example of the posted workers guideline illustrates well the multiple-level goveranance 
nature of social policy: Individual nation-states and the EU Commission were the main 
actors. Since 1993, service enterprises can be active all over the EU. One of the 
consequences has been that companies and even individuals can move to another member 
country, set up business and deliver services according to wages and social wages of their 
country of origin. It is needless to say that, for example, construction companies from 
Portugal, the United Kingdom and Ireland went to high (social) wage countries such as 
France, Germany and Austria. Unemployment among construction workers in the high wage 
countries increased. The unions charged ‘social dumping’. This was a problem hard to solve 
in the EU because multi-level patterns of policymaking are prone to ‘joint-decision traps’ 
(Scharpf 1988) in which efficiency and flexibility are subordinated to political accommodation 
and procedural guarantees. By 1995, sending countries had no incentive to agree on a 
guideline, because it would have undercut the competitive advantages of firms from their 
countries. And the main receiving countries, such as France, Austria and Germany had 
already implemented national laws to regulate the posting of workers from other EU 
countries within freedom of services (Faist et al. 1998: chapter 7). However, there have been 
institutional and political solutions to the problem: 
(1) Because it was an issue of market competition, qualified majority voting and not 
unanimity applied (Arts. 47 and 55 EC-A): After seven years of bargaining, the Council of 
Ministers decided in 1996 on the Directive on the Posting of Workers (96/71/EC) – against 
the votes of Portugal, the United Kingdom and Ireland. According to this directive the 
companies from abroad have to pay minimum wages and provide working conditions 
prevalent in the country of activity. 
(2) One of the prerequisites of this bargain was that the ‘losers’ such as Portugal, could be 
partly ‘compensated’: Logrolling arrangements were possible. For example, Germany aided 
Portugal in building up youth apprenticeship training. 
 
Nevertheless, severe problems have remained in the ‘receiving’ countries such as France 
and Germany. These are primarily second-order effects: In low productivity sectors, such as 
construction, freedom of services has indeed contributed to undermine the institutional 
design of collective bargaining and cooperation between the social partners. For example, 
entrepreneurs in construction quit the employers associations. They are then able to 
undercut wage levels and some social standards set in collective bargaining agreements 
determined by labor unions and employers. So the evidence is mixed: While social rights for 
German construction workers have obviously declined, they have somewhat increased for 
quite a few Portuguese workers. It is mainly a matter of perspective. 
 
 
 
4. Three Modes of Interpreting the Prospects and Consequences of Social 
Citizenship in the European Union 
 
 
Let us now turn to the three stylized notions of social citizenship. No one author has single-
mindedly adhered to one of the perspectives of residual, post-national or nested citizenship. 
And, indeed, each of these concepts describes part of the reality of social citizenship in the 
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EU. However, a critical discussion of these perspectives is helpful to bring out what needs to 
be explored more systematically. 
 
 
(1) Intergovernmentalism: Residual social citizenship
Intergovernmentalists usually claim that social rights on the EU level are minimal (Moravscik 
1999). Consequently, they do not grant high priority to European social citizenship. In its 
exaggerated form, the corresponding notion of residual membership assumes that social 
citizenship in the EU has a sort of ‘virtual quality’ only – very much like the ‘virtual reality’ of 
the internet world. This view emphasizes that ‘positive’ – meaning: market-correcting – social 
policy and rights at the EU level have not had any substantial impact on redressing risks and 
inequalities of EU citizens. In general, the residual perspective is particularly appealing 
because it makes the cogent point that the ‘spillover’ thesis has to be rejected: This thesis 
says that the politics of European integration is driven by a logic of spill-over from 
international market integration to supra-national welfare state formation (see Streeck 1996: 
64). 
 
Usually, we find three arguments supporting this position: First, the European Union is mostly 
engaged in market-making and market-compatibility activities. For example, it encourages 
the free movement of workers.4 The EU, so the view goes, is not so much involved in market-
correcting, i.e. redistributive rights and policies. Also, there is no European law granting 
individual entitlements against Brussels, there are no direct taxes or contributions funding a 
social policy budget which would back such entitlements. Moreover, the European Union is 
not a big social policy spender by itself, only .7 % of the EU budget geared towards social 
policy. And EU expenditures represent little more than 1 percent of member states gross 
national product and less than 4 percent of the central government spending of member 
states; furthermore, the CAP and the structural funds preempt roughly 80 percent of EU 
expenditures (Leibfried and Pierson 2000: 33). In short, social rights are not embodied in a 
European constitution. 
 
Second, EU social rights are effective in very few areas only, most notably gender – ‘equal 
pay for equal work’ (Article 119 EEC, now Article 141 EC-A5), health and safety in the 
workplace and intra-EU migration. These rights pale in their importance vis-à-vis social 
insurance and social assistance rights. In addition, the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and 
Amsterdam (1997) have not yielded a total breakthrough. Only a few more areas are now 
brought under qualified majority voting, such as information and consultation of workers in 
multinational firms. But core issues of wage bargaining are still specifically excluded from EC 
competence – such as remuneration, the right to strike, and (collective) labor union rights. 
 
Third, even if we take social policy in a wider perspective and include the structural & 
regional funds and the Common Agricultural Policy, the record does not get much better. 
Granted, these policies temporarily infuse Southern European member states with means to 
improve infrastructures in traffic, social services and environment – and thus indirectly help 
                                                          
4 The mobility of labour clause in the Treaty of Rome (1957) goes back on Italy’s insistence – at the 
time, Italy was the greatest labour exporter in the EU. Incidentally, average mobility of all 
employees in the EU is only 1.7% in the late 1990s (Eureport social 1998, 6, 3: 11). 
5 The gender clause dates back to France’s intervention in the late 1950s. At the time it was 
considered a purely hortatory clause and lay dormant for about two decades, until the late 1970s. 
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secure the provision, security and legitimation functions of social citizenship. Also, 
temporarily limited structural funds and cohesion funds are intended to counterbalance the 
uneven impacts of ‘globalization’ and the European single market. However, there are at 
least two difficulties. First, given the fact of highly unequal income distribution within the 
poorer regions in the EU, most of the funds probably lead to a decrease in real taxation 
within the subsidised region. For example, if we follow the experience of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno, most of the benefits then end up in the hands of relatively richer individuals. 
Also, we find that EU funding in Southern European countries has not been successful in 
absorbing the impact of economic restructuring of the labor market and has instead led to 
more dualism (see contributions to Brunn 1996). Second, it would also be exceedingly 
difficult to orient redistribution towards individual citizens or small collectives. After all, the 
member states decide upon the actual level of distribution. Given that the level of social 
income distribution between North and South in the EU is even more unequal than income 
from wage labor, it is hard to imagine that transfer payments to individuals would depart from 
the pattern of relatively low transfers to individual citizens in the South (cf. Majone 1994). 
 
Nevertheless, we should critically question the residual social citizenship notion for two 
reasons: First, the Treaty of Amsterdam will probably add to the substance of EU citizenship 
by formally declaring that the basis of the EU lies in including fundamental human rights – as 
defined in the European Convention on Human Rights, Rome 1950 – and fundamental social 
rights  – as defined in the European Social Charter, Torino 1961 and as developed in the 
Community’s own Charter of Social Rights, 1989; and, in addition: practical employment-
related social rights (Articles 117-120) (cf. Roche 1997). 
 
 
(2) Supra-nationalism: Post-national social citizenship
While the intergovernmentalist perspective viz. residual citizenship ultimately disregards the 
emergence of effective individual rights through the EU, the concept of post-national 
citizenship is a genuine inter- and supra-national construct. Post-national citizenship is part of 
the academic musings that we are witnessing the dawning of a nation-less era. It deals with 
international influences upon single nation-state citizenship rights.  
 
There are three main claims: First, human rights have indeed come closer to citizens’ and thus 
also social rights. Post-nationals assert that liberal-democratic nation-states have come to 
increasingly respect human rights of persons, irrespective of citizenship over the past few 
decades (Jacobson 1995). Second, international human rights discourses and international & 
supranational institutions have led nation-states to grant rights to previously excluded groups, 
such as immigrants from outside the EU (Soysal 1994). This is because international norms 
make it easier for non-state actors to appeal to nation-state authorities on the basis of global and 
overarching principles. Third, applied to the EU this means that supra-national institutions such 
as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have come to develop common rights for all residents – 
so that there are nowadays few differences in social rights and social citizenship between 
permanent residents and citizens of EU member states. 
 
Unfortunately, the term post-national citizenship is a veritable contradiction in itself (see, 
however, Bader 1998). First, there are virtually no supranational institutions conferring the status 
of formal membership irrespective of the belonging ‘nationality’, not even the EU. It is also 
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important to note that EU citizenship does not cover third-country citizens. Second, the post-
nationalists do not tell us how their claims contrast with competing explanations. A simpler 
account would say that virtually all nation-states have enshrined civil rights in their constitution 
long before post-national discourses arose. Moreover, as we know, the inclusion of non-citizens 
into welfare states does not mainly depend on nationhood. Access to full social rights has been 
primarily tied to residence and not to nationality. This is a very old welfare principles, dating back 
to times when the nation did not even exist as a collective of solidarity (cf. Reidegeld 1998). 
Therefore, supposedly post-national citizenship can easily be explained as a consequence of 
welfare state principles when border-crossing and settlement of persons occur. 
 
 
(3) Multi-level governance networks: Nested social citizenship
EU citizenship is neither exclusively residual or post-national – although these elements 
capture part of what is happening. In contrast to these perspectives the concept of nested 
citizenship says that there is an interactive system of politics and policies on the state and 
supra-state level. The web of governance networks on multiple levels has become a site of 
building new rights. We should not judge as if the EU level had to compensate for national 
welfare states. The EU is not and probably will not become a federal welfare system like 
those found in regular states, such as Germany, France, or the UK and Spain. What has 
evolved in the EU is an extraordinarily complex network of overlapping authorities and 
attendant social rights, in which member states play a central but far from exclusive role. 
 
A multi-level welfare governance network emerges in three realms: First, the EU in the 
common and intergovernmental pillars is concerned with the regulation of safety and health 
and policies regulating conditions of production. Agreed upon already at Messina in 1955 
were the harmonization of social standards regarding the work week, overtime pay, and 
vacations, the coordination of social policy, and the free movement of labor (Moravcsik 1999: 
141-2). Second, the respective member states have the sole purview over social security 
systems, and above all social service systems.6 In short, most conventional social policies 
remain solidly ensconced behind borders of nation-states, albeit with lesser degrees of 
sovereignty and autonomy. Third, there are now obviously common areas, denoted by the 
intergovernmental pillars of the EU. There are overlapping authorities in fields such as 
employment policy – there will be annual reports and exchanges of so-called ‘best practices’. 
This is the federated component of the supra-national governance network. 
 
The first characteristic is thus of multiple levels of membership: The political actors – 
including nation-states and supra-national, regulatory & federated governance networks, 
associations and citizens – are involved in activities at several different levels. Nested 
citizenship means that European membership cannot be restricted to EU citizenship. It 
encompasses all relevant levels – supra-national and national; and, potentially, the regional 
level. EU citizenship and nation-state citizenship complement each other. 
 
Second, strategy and institutional design are of utmost relevance in an embryonic and 
emerging governance system such as the EU: The political actors ‘innovate’, that is they take 
                                                          
6 Some regions are beginning to exert their authority regarding social policy; take the autonomous 
regions in Spain. However, they do not (yet) grant social rights on their own. Nevertheless, this 
seems to be a realistic future scenario in regionally split societies such as Italy. 
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steps to increase the number of available options, so that some new option is now better 
than the current one. They seek to increase the number of alternatives. This actually 
changes the ‘rules of the game’ and involves efforts at institutional design of social rights and 
social policies. These developments not only occur through an expansion of EU-
competences such as qualified majority voting, but also through courts, such as the ECJ, the 
EU Commission and nation-state governments. 
 
A clarification of the term nested citizenship is now in order: The term has been used before 
– but in the sense of what has been called ‘multiple citizenship’ (Marks 1997: 35). In the 
meaning implied by David Held (1995) multiple citizenship connotes full membership on 
multiple governance levels. Elizabeth Meehan comes closer to the meaning of nested 
citizenship. According to her the emerging new citizenship in the European Union is “neither 
national nor cosmopolitan, but (...) multiple in the sense that the identities, rights and 
obligations associated (...) with citizenship are expressed through an increasingly complex 
configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary 
associations, regions, alliances of regions.” (Meehan 1993: 1) Nested citizenship goes a step 
further: In contrast to multiple citizenship, there is not simply coexistence of different levels. It 
is not only a multi-tiered system like Russian dolls with no interlinks between the different 
levels. The notion of nested citizenship explicitly deals with the interrelationships between the 
different levels. 
 
The characteristics of nested citizenship become clearer when we look at an example of how 
the different levels interact in changing the ‘rules of the game’. This particular illustration 
concerns the increased portability of social rights across nation-state borders in the case of 
German retirees and long-term care insurance. On average, about 30,000 pensioners from 
Germany have lived year-round in Spain in the past twenty years. The main problem 
occurred when these pensioners turned invalid and needed increased care (Seiler 1994). To 
be eligible for social assistance or, nowadays, the benefits of long-term care insurance, they 
had to return to Germany. This changed when the ECJ decided that the benefits of long-term 
care insurance are portable across borders to other EU countries (Sieveking 1998). In this 
case the ECJ has decided and the Federal Republic now has to implement the transnational 
portability of social rights. This example shows that prominent supra-national actors have 
helped to establish parameters for permissible social policies while leaving it to national 
welfare states to formulate the required adjustments. 
 
 
 
5. Nested European Citizenship, EU Citizenship and Nation-State Citizenship 
 
 
So far, the proposition has been that the concept of nested citizenship best captures evolving 
membership rights and rules within a predominantly regulatory governance network. This 
second main part describes in more detail the characteristics of nested citizenship along the 
aforementioned dimensions of citizenship (go back to Figure 1). 
 
In looking at the so-called ‘deficits’ in formal EU membership, we see how the concept of 
nested citizenship differs from both nation-state citizenship and a purely EU citizenship 
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(Figure 2). The main claim here is that social citizenship in the European Union is not as 
demanding as those analysts claim who either deplore the ‘deficits’ on the EU level, or those 
who argue that it is impossible to transpose nation-state models to the EU level. Both 
perspectives share something in common: They take the nation-state model as the main 
point of reference. However, it is time to admit our uncertainty about what kind of governance 
system the EU is. It is a moving target. 
 
The Euro-optimists and the Euro-sceptics elaborate four main deficits: the democractic, 
social, solidarity and cultural deficits. Here, the democratic and social deficit will not be dealt 
with in any great detail. These issues have been belabored at length in the political science 
and social policy literature (for an overview, see Böhner 1998). Suffice it to say that the 
notion of residual membership focuses on the social deficit and deplores the absence of full 
social rights on the EU level: “The policy-making capacities of the Union have not been 
strengthened nearly as much as capabilities at the level of member states have declined.” 
(Scharpf 1999: 220) The democratic deficit is important because the weakness of the 
European Parliament, the absence of a demos; and the procedure to determine the 
executive branch of the EU all point to an important fact: Without a truly democratic setup the 
enabling function of social citizenship cannot be fulfilled. Connected to the democratic and 
social deficits are specific forms of legitimation deficits: Legitimation is partly based on 
democratic procedures which go hand in hand with trust of the demos into the ruling classes, 
and partly on achievement (Almond 1993: 15). In the EU – if compared to standards of 
democracy – there is a gap between a comparatively high technocratic efficiency and low 
degrees of democratic legitimacy. Now, the dimension of ‘belonging’ comes into the fore, the 
solidary and cultural foundations of social rights, policy and citizenship. 
 
 
Figure 3: The ‘Deficits’ of Social Citizenship in the EU 
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Actually, we face a sort of non-problem when we extrapolate the nation-state to the EU. This 
is because regulatory EU-level policies are not as demanding upon solidarity as some of the 
more redistributive nation-state policies. Of course, low levels of solidarity are necessary 
even in the case of EU social policy, so that national electorates accept supra-national 
regulatory social policies. 
 
But let us start with the argument of the Euro-sceptics who try to show that a transfer from 
nation-state to the European Union is impossible: They rightly assume that there is no pan-
European communal solidarity in any strong meaning of the term. However, this would be 
necessary for full-fledged social citizenship because the solidary attitudes and behavior 
needed for raising resources in order to reduce social exclusion is much more practicable 
when a shared sense of belonging can be appealed to – notably a common national identity 
(cf. Miller 1993). Such national identities slowly emerged as communities of solidarity when 
old sodalities disintegrated in early capitalism. The nation-state then substituted them with 
new relations of solidarity that were permanent, did not exclude heavy social risks and were 
encompassing (Tennstedt 1981: 166ff.). The term nation has the connotation of a political 
community shaped by common descent, at the minimum by a common language, culture, 
and history. “... the achievement of the nation-state consisted in solving two problems at 
once: It made possible a new mode of legitimation based on a new, more abstract form of 
social integration.” (Habermas 1998: 402; emphasis in original) In the post-World War II era 
the welfare state then was also part of the affirmation of liberal democracy against the twin 
perils of fascism and Soviet style communism, not only fostering expansive social rights but 
also national social integration. 
 
Solidary citizenship is morally very demanding because it is geared towards security through 
serial reciprocity – consider, for example, the so-called treaty of generations in old age 
insurance. And redistributive policies lessened class tensions and introduced norms of 
equality in addition to those of fairness or equity. In this view, because the nation is such a 
demanding political and social community, it would be nearly impossible to create a similar 
one on the European level (Offe 1998). Only through nation-state solidarity in addition to trust 
between citizens can state authority be sustained and effective. 
 
From the perspective of nested citizenship, two questions arise with such an interpretation: 
First, do we need a solidary collective on the supra-state level patterned on the nation-state 
level so that EU social policy can be carried out effectively? The tentative answer would be: 
not really. The reason is that EU social policy is mostly regulatory. Only in a wider sense is 
EU social policy redistributive, such as structural funds and agricultural policy. However, 
these policies do not carry explicit individual entitlements. But only the demanding 
redistributive policies need solidarity as a ‘moral resource’ on the national level – a sort of 
capital whose value does not diminish by using it over and over again (Hirschman 1984). The 
EU has taken this consideration into account: It is no coincidence that the structural and 
regional funds are designed to be limited in their duration. So, in a way, the objection raised 
by the critics of expanding EU social rights is partly a non-issue. 
 
Second, those who deem it impossible to recreate nation-state solidarity on another level 
describe the present state of solidarity which is partly embedded in complex ways in the 
collective called the nation. However, first, the nation is more of a background context and is 
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not always directly present. For example, when asked about reciprocity in health care (i.e. 
the willingness to pay for others), mandatory insured in Germany responded that prior 
contributions to social insurance constitutes the prime factor upon which eligibility for care 
should be based. Only when prodded further, did they come up with additional indicators, 
such as aspects of belonging (Ullrich 1998). Second, the nation has not always been such an 
important solidarity collective. The history of social policy in Europe teaches us that welfare 
state institutions developed first and then the collective identities around it. Comparative 
studies of welfare state development in the USA, Germany, France and Great Britain show 
that in the course of the collectivizing process of welfare-state building, “collective action 
produced both a collectivity capable of coordinating the actions of its members effectively 
and a collective good which corresponds to this level of integration, but can not exist apart 
from it.” (de Swaan 1988: 4) In Europe and North America, nation-wide social insurances 
only gradually replaced the smaller solidarity communities with bigger ones. Take the 
German health insurance as an example: Bismarckian legislation slowly overtook the mutual-
aid societies after the 1880s (Frevert 1984). 
 
Needless to say, in the real world institutions neither come before collective identity nor do 
collective identities precede the institutions. The causal arrows run both ways. But the point 
to remember is that the critics of European-wide solidarity should not simply be satisfied with 
analyzing the causal relationship from collective solidarity to institution building. It is 
important to remember that solidarity is embedded in a variety of differing welfare institutions 
and rights in the EU member states. Elites and masses within these welfare states usually 
stick closely to historically evolved patterns of risk insurance and welfare. Plausibly, we could 
argue that a transfer of ‘best practices’ among countries is a viable option for further 
convergence of nation-based welfare states. 
 
In sum, both the Euro-optimistic and Euro-pessimistic social policy analysts do not see that 
the built-up of solidarities on the supra-national level on a scale similar to the national level is 
simply not the question. Instead, nested citizenship reigns supreme: national, regional and 
supra-national levels complement each other and have different functions. This is not to say 
that EU-level policies do not fulfill important functions for social citizenship: Gender and 
migration policies, for example, contribute to the enabling function in increasing resources 
and self-confidence of individuals in certain categories – in addition to the functions of 
provision, risk coping and security. Going further, we also should not simply equate the 
genesis of solidarity, its present incarnations and its future potentials. 
 
 
(2) ‘Cultural deficit’ 
Again, when we take the nation-state as the sole foil upon which to model social citizenship 
in Europe, we would face a tall agenda. In the words of an EU expert: “European integration 
must recreate what exists on the level of the nation state, but this is impossible because 
Europe is devoid of a cultural framework independent of the nation state.” (Delanty 1996: 6) 
In essence, so the argument goes, there is a missing cultural framework, as evidenced in the 
weakness or absence of European-level public sphere and collective identity. Allegedly, this 
is so because common culture is the basis for collective ethnic and national identity, which in 
turn is often taken to be the basis for citizenship via the notion of belonging to a nation. And 
common or even shared ideas, symbols and practices, as Max Weber reminded us in his 
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sociology of religion, can serve as sort of train tracks to guide political interests (Weber 1988: 
252). This also applies to social rights.  
 
And there seems to be some truth to this claim. At a European wide level, national-type 
traditions are evidently lacking, or only present in weak and unconvincing ways. At best, we 
can observe the Europeanization of national identities – as happened on a grand scale in the 
Europeanization of German identity, standing in stark contrast to other member states such 
as the United Kingdom, where national identity is still defined in opposition to Europe. While 
an overwhelming large majority of all citizens in Europe does not feel exclusively ‘European’ 
– in contrast to being nationals of a country – representative surveys unearth a substantial 
majority who perceives of the European Union as a protection and not as a danger for 
national identity. Equally, a majority of respondents claims that European and national 
identities are quite compatible (Immerfall and Sobisch 1997: 33; based on Eurobarometer 
No. 38, 1992). All of this makes the concept of a common European identity, and thus the 
concept of a common European citizenship difficult to conceptualize and communicate. 
Nonetheless, a strong minority of citizens in the EU member states agree that there is a 
European cultural identity that is shared by all Europeans, about 38% in 1998 (Europäische 
Kommission 1999: 60; based on Eurobaromenter No. 50, 1998). 
 
European Union social citizenship needs a basis in common understandings. The intellectual 
godfather of the social citizenship concept, T.H. Marshall, succinctly stated: “(c)itizenship 
requires (...) a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilization which is 
a common possession” (Marshall 1964: 92). Marshall’s view was that common national 
cultures or ‘civilisations’ have evolved in societies in the modern period to which all members 
of those societies have equal claim. Such a notion of ‘common civilisation’ is akin to a set of 
‘collective representations’. Collective representations are shared ideas, beliefs, evaluations 
and symbols. They can be expressed in some sort of collective identity – we-feeling or we-
consciousness – and refer to a unit of action. Collective representations are richer than 
individual activities and thus come to be autonomous of the group from which they emerge. They 
help to order and make sense of the world, but they also express, symbolize and interpret social 
and symbolic ties. Collective representations come to lead a life of their own, “once born, obey 
laws all their own” (Durkheim 1965: 471). 
 
In order to forge new coalitions underlying a future basis for social citizenship (Esping-
Andersen 1996: 267), we need to look for collective representations appropriate to the 
developing European project in the context of a multi-level governance network. According to 
Weiler, for example, EU citizenship would consist of “shared values, a shared understanding 
of rights and societal duties and shared rational intellectual culture which transcend organic-
national differences” (1997: 118). Nation-state citizenship would remain the realm of affinity 
and a symbol of nationhood, whilst EU citizenship would be the realm of law and universal 
values. However, going beyond this very general formula, the question is how to analytically 
best approach the cultural foundations for social and nested citizenship. One way to do this 
is to refer to a widespread notion of cultural Europe which is a ‘common culture’ perspective. 
Common culture notions overemphasize the importance of the past and of traditions. 
Instead, it is more useful to speak instead of a ‘common project’ concept (Roche 1999 
speaks of a ‘common space’) of nested citizenship in order to consider the embryonic and 
dynamic evolution of common cultural elements in Europe: A common present and a 
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common future can also serve as a guiding cultural foundation. It is a vision in the sense of 
Sartre’s idea of common projects, advanced by groups-in-fusion who strive for authentic 
freedom (Sartre 1985).7 If we translate Sartre’s thoughts on human freedom to transnational 
citizenship, we could say that nested citizenship can be achieved through participating in a 
common project to shape European history. 
 
If we accepted the common culture notion, we would search for commonalities undergirding 
EU social policy. We would then need to define the set of general cultural traditions 
encompassing all of Europe: Europe as resurrected Christendom, as both the German poet 
Novalis (1983) and the French scholar Alexis de Tocqueville (1968) suggested in the early 
19th century – and which entered social policy via the doctrines of social Catholicism? Or, to 
take another familiar notion, Europe as the inheritor and successor of the Greek and Roman 
Empires – as the Renaissance thinkers believed? Furthermore, to close this incomplete list, 
a Uniting Europe as emanating from 18th century traditions of universalistic human rights 
and enlightenment – as many political thinkers in the liberal tradition would like to have it? A 
Europe of national characters as both the German thinker Johann Gottfried Herder and the 
Spanish writer Ortega y Gasset had in mind? The discomforting answer, of course, is that 
there is no pure, pristine and true cultural tradition of Europe (cf. Münkler 1991).  
 
Given that it is hard to establish a common cultural tradition: Are there generally accepted 
ideas undergirding social policy all over Europe? The most obvious in the case of social 
citizenship would be the notion of subsidiarity. The idea of subsidiarity, originally voiced in 
catholic social doctrine, concerns the sharing of responsibilities and powers among the EU, 
member-state governments, regional and communal levels of governance, and the recipients 
of social citizenship. Basically, this social catholic doctrine voiced in the papal decrees 
Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno, and taken up by former EU presidents such as 
Jacques Delors, instructs authorities to leave to the lower levels the right to act on subjects 
which can be handled at those lower levels. It is the basis for all policy, according to Treaty 
on European Union. Yet, ultimately, it is a vague and difficult concept, prone to manifold 
interpretations. Nowadays, for example, new social democratic and liberal governments in 
the United Kingdom and Germany interpret subsidiarity as a form of social citizenship in 
which citizens have the duty to work – if they are not willing, they are more and more 
excluded from benefits (Jordan 1998). This is quite a cynical interpretation of subsidiarity in 
the face of rampant unemployment in France or Germany and the proliferation of low-wage 
jobs in Britain. 
 
The common culture notion of social citizenship, such as subsidiarity, does not suffice to 
serve as an element for a common membership basis. Taking a conceptual perspective, a 
common culture or uncontested cultural homogeneity cannot serve as a basis for social 
solidarity because of changes in the cultural setup of Europe. A few of these changes, 
without any claim to exhaust the range of possibilities: Life-styles have pluralized and 
processes of ‘individualization’ have multiplied (Beck 1998). Because of international 
migration, various pluri-cultural mixtures have emerged in cities across Europe – and even 
transnational social spaces connecting these cities with mostly third non-EU member 
regions. And we see the renewal of regional collective identities among the various and 
periodically resurgent sub-national ethnic regional and urban-local cultures across Europe – 
                                                          
7 I owe this reference to an oral comment by Dieter Senghaas. 
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think of groups in Scotland, Bretagne, Flandria and Wallonia, Basque country, Catalonia and 
Corsica (Garcia 1994). Therefore, the antiquated common culture notion has to be 
complemented, but not totally replaced, with citizenship as a common project. 
 
The idea of a common project connects past, present and future (cf. Roche 1999): First, 
there has been a common European learning experience growing out of devastating wars in 
the past: One of the original goals of European integration was to guarantee peace and 
political stability, as much as to sustain economic prosperity and renewed growth. At the time 
of the inception of European integration, Europe had been the site of bloody wars for 
centuries. And there has been the common history of the two World Wars originating in 
Europe in the 20th century. Both political elites and mass publics have recognized the 
importance of this memory. This kind of a learning experience is part of a common project 
underlying nested citizenship. Nested citizenship in Europe is characterized by embryonic 
cultural ties which do not constitute a firm common culture but one or several evolving and 
border-crossing spaces. 
 
Also, a characteristic of a common project within which nested citizenship can grow is the 
notion of a common future and present instead of a common past: Most of the common 
culture arguments tend to be weighted towards the heritage and the common past – rather 
than to the common future, or indeed even to the common present. They attribute too much 
significance to memory when conceptualizing culture and collective identity in modernity. 
Take an obvious counter-example: The French Revolution is a symbol that has repeatedly 
been used to connect the past with present- and future-oriented political agendas. Therefore, 
the cautious proposition here is that conceptualizations of common culture which are more 
present and future-oriented are also relevant towards understanding contemporary and 
emerging possibilities for social citizenship in Europe. The notion of a common project is 
relevant not only for aspects of social citizenship but also for the civil, political and cultural 
aspects of membership in political communities and governance networks. 
 
Overall, the project of a common present and future needs to be tied to democratic 
legitimation. An insistence on cultural commonalties by itself and without a recognition of 
Europe as a democratic project would result in the well-known ethnicist, racialist and 
exclusivist thinking and policy features – aptly summarized in slogans such as ‘Fortress 
Europe’.  Therefore, an insistence upon the history but also present and future representative 
and substantive democracy needs recognition. This is obvious as the candidates for future 
membership in the EU in Eastern and Southeastern Europe are still undergoing the transition 
to more full-fledged democratic polities. But even more urgent is the extension of democratic 
principles in the governance structures of the EU itself. This common democratic project 
undergirds the strivings for an emerging collective European identity and solidarity. 
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